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I. INTRODUCTION 
We live in an age in which standard form contracts written by big 
businesses are a common feature of our commercial relationships. Wireless 
phone companies, cable providers, and a bourgeoning array of consumer 
product companies routinely impose binding pre-dispute arbitration agreements 
on consumers, whereby consumers are required to arbitrate, rather than litigate, 
future disputes. Moreover, an ever-increasing number of consumer arbitration 
agreements contain a provision providing that consumers, by accepting the 
agreement, waive the right to arbitrate on a class basis. This trend has proven 
particularly problematic for consumers with monetarily small claims. As both 
courts and commentators have recognized, many small-dollar claims are simply 
not economically feasible to pursue on an individual basis.1 Thus, barring 
consumers from pursuing a claim as a class has the potential to leave millions of 
consumers without a remedy for corporate wrongdoing. 
                                                                                                                       
 * Articles Editor, Ohio State Law Journal; J.D., The Ohio State University Moritz 
College of Law, expected 2013; B.S., Miami University, 2010. I would like to thank 
Professor Sarah Rudolph Cole for her guidance on earlier drafts of this Note. 
 1 See, e.g., In re Am. Express Merchs.’ Litig., 634 F.3d 187, 197–98 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(“[T]he cost of plaintiffs’ individually arbitrating their dispute [with the company] would be 
prohibitive . . . .”); see also J. Maria Glover, Beyond Unconscionability: Class Action 
Waivers and Mandatory Arbitration Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1735, 1737 (2006) 
(explaining that a consumer claim is typically a “negative-value claim[ ],” meaning that the 
total costs of pursuing the claim exceed the total expected recovery for that claim). 
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Until recently, courts were split as to whether class arbitration waivers are 
enforceable.2 However, on April 27, 2011, the United States Supreme Court in 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion upheld the ability of companies to use 
arbitration clauses to exempt themselves from class actions.3 While the precise 
impact of Concepcion is yet to be determined, the Court’s holding makes it 
clear that companies can avoid not only actions in court but also classwide 
arbitration proceedings through the simple expedient of incorporating a class 
arbitration waiver within the scope of an arbitration provision.4 As recognized 
by Justice Stephen Breyer in his dissenting opinion in Concepcion, “[t]he 
realistic alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero 
individual suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”5 
Accordingly, in the post-Concepcion landscape, the most pressing issue in 
consumer arbitration reform is how to provide a viable forum for consumers 
with low-value claims to seek redress. This Note examines the need for 
consumer protection in arbitral proceedings in the wake of Concepcion and 
proposes amending the Consumer Due Process Protocol (Consumer Protocol) to 
remedy consumer injury and to deter corporate misconduct.  
II. AT&T V. CONCEPCION: THE DEATH KNELL OF CLASS ARBITRATION? 
Concepcion, a 5–4 decision by the U.S. Supreme Court, dramatically 
reconfigured the law of class arbitration waivers and the manner in which 
businesses will contract with consumers. In what has been deemed a 
“devastating blow to consumer rights,”6 the Court’s ruling suggests that 
companies can and now will insulate themselves from facing meaningful 
accountability by including class arbitration waiver language in their boilerplate 
contracts with consumers. Without reform, Concepcion will shield companies 
against liability by eliminating the ability of many consumers to pursue 
legitimate, albeit small, claims.  
                                                                                                                       
 2 Compare Anderson v. Comcast, Corp., 500 F.3d 66, 72 (1st Cir. 2007) (upholding 
class arbitration waiver and noting federal policy favoring arbitration), and Johnson v. W. 
Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 374–75 (3d Cir. 2000) (enforcing class arbitration waiver), 
with Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1150 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding class arbitration waiver 
unenforceable). 
 3 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1740  (2011). 
 4 See Myriam Gilles, AT&T Mobility vs. Concepcion: From Unconscionability to 
Vindication of Rights, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 15, 2011, 4:25 PM), http://www.scotusblog. 
com/2011/09/att-mobility-vs-concepcion-from-unconscionability-to-vindication-of-rights/ 
(“[T]he real game-changer for class action litigation [is Concepcion], as it permits most of 
the companies that touch consumers’ day-to-day lives to place themselves beyond the reach 
of aggregate litigation by simply incorporating class waiver language into their standard-
form contracts.”). 
 5 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1761 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Carnegie v. Household 
Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004)). 
 6 Editorial, Gutting Class Action: The Five Conservatives of the Supreme Court Chose 
Corporations Over Everyone Else, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2011, at A26. 
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The underlying dispute in Concepcion involved a cellular phone contract 
between Vincent and Liza Concepcion and AT&T Mobility (AT&T).7 Lured by 
the promise of “free” cell phones, the Concepcions purchased a two-year 
service contract from AT&T.8 After learning that they had to pay $30.22 in 
sales taxes for the devices, the Concepcions initiated a class action lawsuit, 
alleging that AT&T had engaged in false advertising and fraud by charging 
sales tax on “free” phones.9 In response, AT&T moved to compel arbitration 
under the pre-dispute arbitration clause in its service agreement which, inter 
alia, prohibited consumers from bringing class arbitrations, requiring 
consumers instead to arbitrate claims individually.10  
Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit found the class arbitration 
waiver at issue unenforceable under state law. The district court noted that the 
provisions in the arbitration agreement were an “adequate substitute” for 
consumers seeking class action,11 but nonetheless, concluded the class waiver 
was unconscionable and therefore invalid pursuant to California’s Discover 
Bank rule.12 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the ruling, also finding the 
class arbitration waiver unconscionable under California’s Discover Bank 
rule.13 
The Supreme Court then granted certiorari to determine whether the Federal 
Arbitration Act (FAA) “prohibits States from conditioning the enforceability of 
certain arbitration agreements on the availability of classwide arbitration 
procedures.”14 Writing for the majority, Justice Antonin Scalia clarified the 
preemptive reach of the FAA and continued the Court’s longstanding trend of 
enforcing arbitration agreements.15 
                                                                                                                       
 7 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. at 1744–45. The arbitration provision read as follows: “You and AT&T agree that 
each may bring claims against the other only in your or its individual capacity, and not as a 
plaintiff or class member in any purported class or representative proceeding.” Brief for 
Respondents at 3, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (No. 09-
893), 2012 WL 441292 at *3. 
 11 Laster v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. 05cv1167 DMS (AJB), 2008 WL 5216255, at *12 
(S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2008). 
 12 Id. at *14. The Discover Bank rule classifies as unconscionable class arbitration 
waivers contained in consumer contracts of adhesion that would exempt companies from 
accountability for “cheat[ing] large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of 
money.” Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005).  
 13 Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 2009). The court also 
held that the Discover Bank rule was not preempted by the FAA because that rule was 
simply “a refinement of the unconscionability analysis applicable to contracts generally in 
California.” Id. at 857. 
 14 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744. 
 15  See, e.g., Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 111 (2001) (“To give 
effect to [its] purpose, the FAA compels judicial enforcement of a wide range of written 
arbitration agreements.”); see also Richard A. Nagareda, The Litigation-Arbitration 
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The FAA16 was enacted in 1925 as a direct response to the reluctance of 
state courts to enforce commercial arbitration agreements.17 Over the last 
several decades, the Court has interpreted the FAA broadly, stating the general 
policy that “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be 
resolved in favor of arbitration.”18 Consistent with this pervasive federal 
scheme and trend favoring the enforcement of arbitration provisions, the Court 
in Concepcion upheld the validity of class arbitration waivers, ruling that the 
FAA’s liberal policy favoring arbitration preempted California’s Discover Bank 
rule that made class arbitration waivers unenforceable in many consumer 
contracts.19 
In reaching its decision, the majority explained that class arbitration 
sacrifices the informality, speed, and low cost of arbitration, while also greatly 
increasing the risks to defendants who may be forced to settle questionable 
claims.20 According to Justice Scalia, although California’s Discover Bank rule 
“does not require classwide arbitration, it allows any party to a consumer 
contract to demand it ex post.”21 While acknowledging the dissent’s claim that 
“class proceedings are necessary to prosecute small-dollar claims that might 
otherwise slip through the legal system,” Justice Scalia concluded, “States 
cannot require a procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA.”22 
With Concepcion in the rearview mirror, the decision’s predictable effects 
are now taking form. When the ruling was first issued, one commentator 
deemed the decision a “game-changer” and “one of the most important and 
favorable cases for businesses in a very long time.”23 Today, more than one 
year later, companies are routinely implementing class arbitration waivers and 
courts are frequently citing Concepcion as the reason for dismissing consumer 
class action claims.24 Thus, without reform, millions of consumers will continue 
to remain without access to justice for corporate wrongdoing.  
To understand the harsh and inequitable consequences of class arbitration 
waivers, consider the facts of Concepcion. By including a term in its contract 
                                                                                                                       
Dichotomy Meets the Class Action, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1069, 1092 (2011) (“[T]he 
modern Court has never yet met an arbitration clause that it didn’t like.”). 
 16 9 U.S.C. §§ 116 (2006). 
 17 See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991) (asserting that 
the purpose of the FAA was to reverse the “longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration 
agreements”).  
 18 Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 2425 (1983).  
 19 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753. 
 20 Id. at 175152. 
 21 Id. at 1750. 
 22 Id. at 1753. 
 23 Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Allows Contracts That Prohibit Class-Action 
Arbitration, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2011, at B3 (citing law professor Brian T. Fitzpatrick). 
 24 PUBLIC CITIZEN & NAT’L ASS’N OF CONSUMER ADVOCATES, JUSTICE DENIED—ONE 
YEAR LATER: THE HARMS TO CONSUMERS FROM THE SUPREME COURT’S CONCEPCION 
DECISION ARE PLAINLY EVIDENT 6 (2012), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/ 
concepcion-anniversary-justice-denied-report.pdf. 
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prohibiting consumers from going to court and instead requiring one-on-one 
arbitration, AT&T precluded consumers from pursuing a claim as a class. Only 
the few consumers willing to incur the costs of bringing an individual claim 
would have any chance at a recovery. Is a consumer likely to bring a $30 claim? 
No. Under the current rules of arbitration, a consumer is required to pay a filing 
fee of up to $125 for any claim under $10,000, while the business is required to 
pay all additional costs.25 To make matters worse, even if a consumer prevails 
in arbitration, AT&T can continue its deceptive scheme of charging consumers 
sales tax on phones that are advertised as free.  
As this example demonstrates, by including a class arbitration waiver in its 
arbitration agreement with consumers, a company is essentially handed a get-
out-of-jail-free card for deceptive and potentially fraudulent business schemes, 
while consumers are effectively precluded from vindicating their claims. Thus, 
reform is needed to incentivize consumers to bring claims on an individual basis 
and to deter companies from future misconduct.  
III. A PATH TO REFORM: THE CONSUMER PROTOCOL 
While some commentators contend that the class mechanism is the only 
viable solution to provide consumers with incentive to assert low-value 
claims,26 this Note suggests that a better alternative is to ensure that arbitration 
agreements contain sufficient procedural safeguards to guarantee a fair process 
for all parties. As the majority in Concepcion noted, by permitting class 
arbitration, with its attendant discovery, class certification, and class settlement 
formalities, the parties essentially forgo the advantages of arbitration.27 Justice 
Grodin of the California Supreme Court has explained that class arbitration 
“must be evaluated, not in relation to some ideal but in relation to its 
alternatives.”28 Given the Consumer Protocol’s widespread influence on 
arbitration, amending the Consumer Protocol is an effective alternative that 
would ensure all consumers are subject to fair arbitration agreements.  
                                                                                                                       
 25 See AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSUMER-RELATED DISPUTES SUPPLEMENTARY 
PROCEDURES (2005), available at http://www.foreclosuremediationfl.adr.org/ 
sp.asp?id=22014 [hereinafter SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES].  
 26 See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class 
Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 12 (2000) (contending 
that the ability to aggregate claims is crucial to protect the rights of those individuals “who 
lack the resources to litigate individual claims”). 
 27 Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750–52. 
 28 Keating v. Superior Court of Alameda Cnty., 645 P.2d 1192, 1209 (Cal. 1982). 
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A. Background and Influence of the Consumer Protocol 
In response to concerns regarding fairness in arbitration, the National 
Consumer Disputes Advisory Committee29 crafted the Consumer Protocola 
set of standards and procedures designed to ensure a fair arbitration process.30 
The Consumer Protocol sets forth fifteen principles to serve as minimum 
safeguards for inclusion in all consumer arbitration agreements, including: 
informed consent, convenient hearing locations, and reasonable costs.31 
Although it does not have the force of law,32 the Consumer Protocol has 
experienced widespread influence in three ways: it has (1) been adopted by the 
major arbitral service providers, (2) served as a guide to businesses drafting 
consumer arbitration agreements, and (3) created a benchmark for courts to use 
in deciding whether to enforce particular consumer arbitration agreements.  
One of the most, if not the most, significant impacts of the Consumer 
Protocol on individual consumers was the adoption of its standards and 
principles by the major arbitration service providers.33 The largest arbitration 
providers, as well as many independent arbitration service providers, have 
endorsed the Consumer Protocol, incorporated its principles into their own 
arbitration rules, and agreed to administer consumer arbitrations only when the 
                                                                                                                       
 29 The National Consumer Disputes Advisory Committee was convened to “advise the 
American Arbitration Association in the development of standards and procedures for the 
equitable resolution of consumer disputes.” Arbitration or Arbitrary: The Misuse of 
Mandatory Arbitration to Collect Consumer Debts: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Domestic Policy, H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 111th Cong. 2 (2009) 
(statement of Richard W. Naimark, Senior Vice President, Int’l Ctr. for Dispute Resolution, 
Am. Arbitration Ass’n). This Committee was comprised of representatives from a wide array 
of consumer groups, providers of goods and services, government agencies, and academic 
institutions. See id. In addition to its advisory role, the Committee hoped that the standards it 
proposed would have a broader effect, including influencing judicial opinions regarding the 
“enforceability of arbitration agreements.” See Margaret M. Harding, The Limits of the Due 
Process Protocols, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 369, 406 (2004).  
 30 The Consumer Protocol’s provisions are designed to provide a “fundamentally-fair 
ADR process,” by assuring the inclusion of certain due process protections. See NAT’L 
CONSUMER DISPUTES ADVISORY COMM., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, CONSUMER DUE 
PROCESS PROTOCOL Principle 1 (1998) [hereinafter CONSUMER PROTOCOL]. 
 31 See id. at Table of Contents. 
 32 The Consumer Protocol is a self-regulating mechanism that arbitration providers 
voluntarily agree to follow. Harding, supra note 29, at 370–71. Harding asserts, however, 
that even voluntary protocols have significant influence. Id. at 452. Voluntary compliance 
with the Consumer Protocol is due in part to the “desire of arbitration providers to assure the 
fundamental integrity of the process provided by their organizations.” Carole J. Buckner, 
Due Process in Class Arbitration, 58 FLA. L. REV. 185, 222 (2006). 
 33 See Harding, supra note 29, at 407. The American Arbitration Association (AAA), 
the largest arbitration service provider, adopted the Consumer Protocol as “the essential 
guidepost for the Association’s participation in consumer ADR programs.” Id. (citing 
Thomas J. Stipanowich, Resolving Consumer Disputes, DISP. RESOL. J., Aug. 1998, at 13). 
In turn, other major arbitration service providers have also adopted consumer due process 
standards. Id. 
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arbitration agreements comply with the Consumer Protocol.34 The impact of 
these providers adhering to the Consumer Protocol is substantial, given that “the 
vast majority of arbitrations conducted both domestically and internationally are 
‘sponsored’ in some way by ‘provider’ organizations.”35 Generally, consumer 
arbitration agreements designate one of these provider organizations as the 
entity that will administer arbitration services in connection with a dispute.36 
Accordingly, the adoption and enforcement of the Consumer Protocol by the 
arbitration providers protects consumers from inequitable arbitration 
agreements because these arbitration providers refuse to provide arbitration 
services if a company’s arbitration agreement does not comport with the 
Consumer Protocol.  
While some commentators criticize the Consumer Protocol for lacking a 
mechanism to ensure compliance with its provisions,37 recent research 
demonstrates that private enforcement by the service providers effectively 
regulates the fairness of consumer arbitration clauses. For instance, a study by 
the Searle Civil Justice Institute found that a substantial majority of consumer 
arbitration agreements comply with the Consumer Protocol.38 Moreover, the 
data showed that service providers are effective at identifying and refusing to 
                                                                                                                       
 34 See id. (citing the AAA, National Arbitration Forum, and JAMS as major arbitration 
providers that have adopted consumer due process standards in response to the Consumer 
Protocol). Where a company’s arbitration agreement does not meet the due process 
standards set forth in the Consumer Protocol, these providers will refuse to arbitrate disputes 
arising between the business and the consumer. See, e.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, AAA 
REVIEW OF CONSUMER CLAUSES, available at http://www.foreclosuremediationfl.adr.org/ 
si.asp?id=4453 (last visited July 28, 2012) (stating the AAA policy of refusing to administer 
arbitration proceedings pursuant to consumer clauses that do not “substantially and 
materially” comply with the Consumer Protocol). 
 35 Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics Issues in Arbitration and Related Dispute Resolution 
Processes: What’s Happening and What’s Not, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 949, 965 (2002). 
 36 For example, AT&T’s arbitration agreement identifies the AAA as the arbitration 
service provider that will administer its disputes and read as follows: “AT&T and you agree 
to arbitrate all disputes and claims between us. . . . The arbitration will be . . . administered 
by the AAA.”  2.2 Arbitration Agreement, AT&T Wireless Customer Agreement, available 
at http://www.att.com/shop/legalterms.html?toskey=wirelessCustomerAgreement (last 
visited Aug. 23, 2012). 
 37 See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Consumer Arbitration, in ARBITRATION LAW IN 
AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 174 (Edward Brunet et al. eds., 2006) (“Because the 
protocols are simply policies adopted by arbitration providers, there is no clear enforcement 
mechanism.”). 
 38 See generally SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INST., CONSUMER ARBITRATION BEFORE THE 
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION: PRELIMINARY REPORT (2009), available at 
https://www.aryme.com/docs/adr/2-2-1235/informe-sealy-aaa-eeuu-2009-us-sealy-report- 
aaa.pdf. This study found that 76.6% of arbitration agreements fully complied with the 
Consumer Protocol and 98.2% of arbitration agreements either complied with the Consumer 
Protocol or were properly identified and responded to by the AAA for non-compliance. Id. at 
110. 
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administer clauses that do not adhere to the Consumer Protocol.39 Given the 
widespread adoption of the Consumer Protocol by arbitration providers and the 
proven effectiveness of private regulation, amending the Consumer Protocol 
would effectively protect small claims plaintiffs in the aftermath of Concepcion. 
In addition to having a significant impact on arbitration through its adoption 
by the major arbitration service providers, the Consumer Protocol also provides 
guidance to businesses drafting consumer arbitration agreements. Recent 
empirical research supports the supposition that companies do, in fact, use the 
Consumer Protocol as a guide when drafting arbitration agreements. 
Specifically, one study found that in response to a compliance review by the 
American Arbitration Association (AAA) more than 150 businesses either 
waived or revised problematic provisions in arbitration agreements.40 
Moreover, some attorneys advise business clients to draft consumer arbitration 
agreements in accordance with the Consumer Protocol.41 Thus, as lower courts 
struggle toward a consensus of the procedures required for arbitral fairness in 
the wake of Concepcion, an amended Consumer Protocol would provide 
companies with a baseline set of rules to follow when drafting pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements. 
Finally, the Consumer Protocol’s impact is seen in the courtroom, where 
courts widely cite the Consumer Protocol when determining the enforceability 
of a particular arbitration agreement.42 For instance, in Green Tree Financial 
Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, Justice Ginsburg noted the effectiveness of the 
Consumer Protocol as a guide to industry standards.43 There, the arbitration 
agreement at issue was silent as to the “rules under which arbitration [would] 
proceed or the costs a consumer [was] likely to incur in arbitration.”44 Justice 
Ginsburg explained that the drafter of the contract could have provided fair 
cost-allocation rules “by specifying . . . that arbitration would be governed by 
the rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA).”45 In a footnote, 
Justice Ginsburg included sample arbitration providers that have developed 
                                                                                                                       
 39 See id. at 110–11 (noting that the AAA refused to administer 9.4% of  consumer 
cases when the business did not to comply with the Consumer Protocol). 
 40 Id. at 96. 
 41 See Alan S. Kaplinsky, The Use of Pre-Dispute Arbitration Agreements by Consumer 
Financial Services Providers, in CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES INSTITUTE 493, 508 
(Practicing Law Institute Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series No. 23609, 
2010) (advising business clients to draft fair arbitration clauses that comply with consumer 
due process protocols). In fact, Kaplinsky has explained that it is in a company’s best 
interest to draft a fair arbitration agreement that complies with the Consumer Protocol. See 
Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, The Impact of Concepcion on Consumer Financial 
Services Arbitration Agreements and the Future of Consumer Litigation, CONSUMER FIN. 
SERV. LAW REPORT, May 25, 2011, at 4 (noting that consumer-friendly arbitration provisions 
promote customer goodwill and that courts look more favorably upon such agreements). 
 42 See Harding, supra note 29, at 370. 
 43 531 U.S. 79, 94–95 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 95. 
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fairness principles, specifically listing the Consumer Protocol as a model “for 
fair cost and fee allocation.”46 As this case demonstrates, the Consumer 
Protocol serves two functions for the courts: it informs the courts when 
articulating their own standards of due process necessary for enforcement of an 
arbitration agreement and provides a model from which to judge specific 
arbitration agreements.  
B. Need for Amendment to the Consumer Protocol 
While the Consumer Protocol requires minimum standards of fairness and 
provides arbitration to consumers at a relatively low dollar amount,47 the 
problem is that the Consumer Protocol provides no incentive for individual 
consumers to bring a recovery action when the claim is monetarily small.  
As originally drafted, the Consumer Protocol states that “a fundamental 
principle of our civil justice system is that a person should never be denied 
access to a court due to an inability to pay court costs.”48 Accordingly, Principle 
6 of the Consumer Protocol reads as follows: “Providers of goods and services 
should develop ADR programs which entail reasonable cost to Consumers 
based on the circumstances of the dispute, including, among other things, the 
size and nature of the claim, the nature of goods or services provided, and the 
ability of the Consumer to pay.”49 However, the Consumer Protocol was drafted 
in the early years of consumer arbitration before the drafters could anticipate the 
major issue facing courts today: how to remedy consumers with small claims in 
the wake of Concepcion.50 As this Note has demonstrated, many consumers are 
now required to bring low-value claims on an individual basis, thus making 
arbitration prohibitively expensive for some consumers under the current 
standards of the Consumer Protocol.  
Therefore, even with the Consumer Protocol, consumer arbitration reform is 
necessary to ensure that consumers are “never . . . denied access to a court due 
to an inability to pay.”51 
                                                                                                                       
 46 Id. at 95 n.2. 
 47 A recent study by the Searle Civil Justice Institute, which examined in detail 
consumer arbitration cases administered by the AAA, found that “[i]n cases with claims 
seeking less than $10,000, consumer claimants paid an average of $96 ($1 administrative 
fees + $95 arbitrator fees).” SEARLE CIVIL JUSTICE INST., supra note 38, at xiii. 
 48 CONSUMER PROTOCOL, supra note 30, at Principle 6, Reporter’s Comments. 
 49 CONSUMER PROTOCOL, supra note 30, at Principle 6. 
 50 In an article calling for the reform of consumer arbitration and proposing a 
codification of the Consumer Protocol, Professor Amy Schmitz notes that the Consumer 
Protocol did not address the issue of class relief. See Amy Schmitz, Regulation Rash? 
Questioning the AFA’s Approach for Protecting Arbitration Fairness 28 (Univ. of Colo. 
Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 10-02, 2010). 
 51  CONSUMER PROTOCOL, supra note 30, at Principle 6, Reporter’s Comments. 
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IV. PROPOSED REVISION TO THE CONSUMER PROTOCOL 
Given the concerns that class arbitration waivers pose for consumers, this 
Note proposes an amendment to the Consumer Protocol that would both 
incentivize consumers to bring claims on an individual basis and deter corporate 
misconduct. 
The current text of Section C-8 of the Supplementary Procedures reads as 
follows: 
Fees and Deposits to be Paid by the Consumer: If the consumer’s claim or 
counterclaim does not exceed $10,000, then the consumer is responsible for 
one-half the arbitrator’s fees up to a maximum of $125.52 
The proposed amendment would provide an additional subsection relating 
directly to small claims and would read53: 
(a) Claims seeking $10,000 or less.  
(i) Providers of goods and services shall reimburse a Consumer for 
payment of the filing fee for all non-frivolous claims. 
(ii) Providers of goods and services shall reimburse a prevailing 
Consumer the amount of reasonable attorneys’ fees and any expenses 
reasonably accrued for investigating, preparing, and pursuing the 
claim. 
(iii) The Consumer may choose whether the arbitration proceeds in 
person, by telephone, or based only on written submissions. 
(iv) In the event that an arbitrator issues an award in the Consumer’s favor 
that is greater than the Provider’s last written settlement offer prior to 
arbitration, the Provider will pay the Consumer an amount equal to 
the value of the maximum claim that may be brought in small claims 
court in the county of the Consumer’s billing address or the arbitral 
award, whichever is greater. 
(v) In the event that an arbitrator awards the Consumer more than the 
Provider’s last settlement offer, then the Provider will pay the 
Consumer’s attorney twice the amount of attorneys’ fees. 
(vi) Consumers and their attorneys are not required to keep the results of 
the arbitration confidential. 
Although the class action certainly serves a significant purpose, a system 
that provides sufficient procedural safeguards has “the potential to serve many 
                                                                                                                       
 52 See SUPPLEMENTARY PROCEDURES, supra note 30; see also CONSUMER ARBITRATION 
POLICY: MINIMUM STANDARDS OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS, JAMS: THE RESOLUTION 
EXPERTS 3 (2009), available at http://www.jamsadr.com/files/Uploads/Documents/JAMS-
Rules/JAMS_Consumer_Min_Stds-2009.pdf  (stating that when a consumer initiates 
arbitration against a company, the consumer must pay only $250, and when a corporation 
initiates the arbitration, the company must pay all arbitration fees). 
 53 This proposed text is modeled after the consumer-friendly provisions included in 
AT&T’s arbitration agreement at issue in Concepcion.  
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of the same public interests served by class actions.”54 Amending the Consumer 
Protocol would retain the goals of arbitration, while also providing access to 
justice for those consumers who could otherwise pursue claims only in a class 
proceeding.  
A. Incentivizing Consumers with Small Claims 
In the wake of Concepcion, the provisions of this amendment would 
adequately replace the class vehicle by guaranteeing substantial, cost-effective 
recovery in two ways: (1) by providing the opportunity for a considerable 
recovery when a company who forces a consumer into arbitration refuses to 
settle, and (2) by creating substantial incentives for the company to settle with a 
consumer in order to avoid the possibility of having to pay a substantial 
premium. By requiring companies to include a number of consumer-friendly 
provisions in binding pre-dispute arbitration agreements, the Consumer Protocol 
would incentivize both consumers and attorneys to vindicate otherwise 
uneconomic claims.55  
First, the amendment would resolve the “negative-value claim” problem by 
providing arbitration to low-value claimants at no cost, provided the claim is not 
deemed frivolous.56 Under the current rules provided by the AAA, consumers 
are responsible for paying some filings fees and sometimes a portion of the 
arbitrator’s fees. However, requiring a company to pay all costs of arbitration 
when the claim is for a small-dollar value would incentivize a consumer to seek 
redress.  
Next, the proposed amendment addresses the concern that an attorney is 
unlikely to take low-value claims absent the class mechanism.57 By including a 
provision that guarantees double attorney fees for a small claim in which the 
consumer receives an award more favorable than the company’s last written 
                                                                                                                       
 54 See Nancy Welsh, Is the Supreme Court Demanding Enough As It Provides 
Incentives for the Private Funding of a Federal Small Claims Court?, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 
21, 2011, 2:13 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/is-the-supreme-court-demanding-
enough-as-it-provides-incentives-for-the-private-funding-of-a-federal-small-claims-court/. 
 55 As one commentator explained, social science research shows that people are not 
entirely rational decision makers, noting that people gamble in casinos. Id. Thus, an 
arbitration agreement with consumer-friendly provisions would encourage consumers to 
make claims, even when the claims are for small-dollar values.  
 56 This provision would also protect businesses from the possibility of having to pay the 
costs of frivolous claims. If the arbitrator finds that either the substance of a consumer’s 
claim or the relief sought is frivolous or brought for an improper purpose, as measured by 
the standards set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11(b), then the payment of 
such fees will be governed by Section C-8 of the  Supplementary Procedures.  
 57 As Justice Breyer points out in his dissent, “[w]hat rational lawyer would . . . 
represent [a client] . . . for the possibility of fees stemming from a $30.22 claim?” AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1761 (2011). 
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offer, the amendment provides incentive for attorneys to bring such claims.58 
While each individual recovery would not equate the enormous payoffs related 
to a successful class action claim, this provision would encourage a market for 
attorneys to bring relatively non-complex consumer claims. Moreover, by 
removing the confidentiality provision generally required in arbitration 
provisions, attorneys could advertise recoveries, informally aggregate claims, 
and disseminate information in the manner of their choosing to make arbitration 
more cost-effective.  
Not only does this amendment lower the costs of arbitration for consumers 
and attorneys, but also this amendment provides consumers with the potential 
for substantial recovery. Similar to the significant “premium” offered by AT&T 
in Concepcion,59 this amendment would provide the consumer a significant 
windfall if the consumer is awarded an amount in a low-value claim that is 
greater than the company’s last written settlement offer. If the consumer does 
recover more than the company’s last written settlement offer, in addition to 
having cost-free, expedient arbitration, the company would pay the consumer 
the greater of the amount of the award or an amount equal to the value of that 
maximum claim that may be brought in small claims court. Thus, even a 
consumer with a $30 claim would have the potential to turn a meritorious low-
value claim into a substantial recovery. Of course, the company could always 
choose to settle with the consumer, but even in that case, the consumer would 
be made whole before the formal arbitration process commenced.  
  
                                                                                                                       
 58 In a case involving an arbitration agreement that contained a similar provision for 
attorneys’ fees, a number of attorneys testified that they would be willing to represent 
consumers invoking such arbitration procedures. See Brief of Appellant at 10–11, Coneff v. 
AT&T Corp., No. 09-35563 (9th Cir. Nov. 10, 2009).  
 59 The arbitration agreement at issue in Concepcion contained a similar provision 
providing claimants with a significant windfall if they obtained an arbitration award greater 
than AT&T’s last settlement offer. 131 S. Ct. at 1753. As the majority in Concepcion noted, 
the District Court found that such a scheme would provide incentive for individual 
arbitration if the claims were not immediately settled. Id. In fact, the District Court found 
that the Concepcions “were better off under their arbitration agreement with AT&T than 
they would have been as participants in a class action . . . .” Id.  
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B. Deterring Business Misconduct 
In addition to incentivizing consumers to bring claims on an individual 
basis, this proposed amendment would also deter companies from future 
wrongdoing. In the aftermath of Concepcion, consumer advocates have attacked 
the Court’s holding as providing businesses with immunity from accountability, 
even when a business has broken the law.60 Recognizing that the class 
proceeding serves the important role of deterring business misconduct, the 
amendment includes provisions to adequately replace the deterrent effects of 
class actions. 
First, the amendment would prompt companies to make favorable 
settlement offers, even to claims of low-dollar value, and would punish those 
companies who propose insufficient offers. Under the terms of the amendment, 
if the arbitrator awards the consumer more than the settlement value last offered 
by the company, then the company will pay the customer a significant sum. 
This would provide the company with a strong incentive to take consumer 
complaints seriously. 
Moreover, the amendment creates a powerful deterrent against systematic 
wrongdoing by including a provision that does not require consumers or their 
attorneys to keep arbitration results confidential. Because the provision would 
enable consumers or attorneys to advertise or publicize their complaints, 
companies engaged in wrongful behavior would face the risk of serial claims. 
Likewise, given advances in technology and communication, it is likely that if a 
company engages in unfair business practices, disgruntled consumers will alert 
other consumers.61 Furthermore, given that the amendment offers consumers 
the option of proceeding in arbitration over the telephone, a company engaged 
in unfair business practices will face the threat of mass arbitrations by upset 
consumers, and the cost of providing arbitration for such a large number of 
consumers may cause the company to change its business practice.  
Importantly, the amendment addresses the concern that the cost of pursuing 
a low-value claim would necessarily exceed any prospective recovery. 
Therefore, amending the Consumer Protocol provides the necessary protection 
to provide small-claim consumers with access to a forum to effectively 
vindicate their rights. 
                                                                                                                       
 60 See Arbitration: Is it Fair When Forced?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 112th Cong. 10 (2011) (statement of F. Paul Bland, Senior Attorney, Public 
Justice). 
 61 In another case in which consumers alleged deceptive practices by a cell phone 
provider, after issuing a press release announcing the claim filed against the cell phone 
provider, 4,700 consumers with similar complaints contacted the Consumer Watchdog, a 
non-profit consumer advocacy organization. See Brief of Marygrace Coneff, et al. as Amici 
Curiae in Supporting Respondents at 10, AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 
1740 (2011) (No. 09-893). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
As demonstrated by AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, class arbitration waivers 
have the potential to significantly restrain the ability of consumers with small 
claims to hold businesses accountable for their misconduct. While Concepcion 
involved a decidedly “small” claim, its potential impact on consumers is 
substantial. To provide consumers with meaningful protection from business 
misconduct, efforts at arbitration reform should focus on enabling all consumers 
to vindicate their rights, including consumers with small claims. This Note has 
proposed one such solution. Amending the Consumer Protocol would provide 
businesses with a model for drafting arbitration agreements, guide courts in 
their decisions of whether to enforce particular arbitration agreements, and, 
significantly, ensure that consumers like the Concepcions are afforded access to 
justice. 
